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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Capital structure refers to the different options used by a firm in financing its 
assets. Generally, a firm can go for different levels/mixes of debts, equity, or other 
financial arrangements. It can combine bonds, TFCs, lease financing, bank loans or 
many other options with equity in an overall attempt to boost the market value of the 
firm.  
In their attempt to maximise the overall value, firms differ with respect to 
capital structures. This has given birth to different capital structure theories that 
attempt to explain the variation in capital structures of firms over time or across 
regions. On the other hand, empirical evidence is also not sometime consistent in 
substantiating a particular capital structure theory.   
This paper attempts to answer the question of what determines the capital 
structure of Pakistani listed firms other than those in financial sector. According to 
the authors’ knowledge, it is the first thorough study to be conducted in Pakistan 
with regard to determinants of capital structure of listed non-financial firms. Though 
Booth, et al. (2001) have worked on the determinants of capital structure of 10 
developing countries including Pakistan; however, their study analyses data only for 
the firms that were included in the KSE-100 Index from 1980 to 1987.   
The paper is organised as follows. Section 1 introduces the paper. In the next 
section, some of the theoretical literature concerning the determinants and effects of 
leverage is reviewed. In Section 3 we describe our data and we justify the choice of 
the variables used in our analysis. In Section 4 we estimate the model used in our 
analysis. The Fifth Section presents the results and conclusion.  
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2.  THEORIES OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
 
2.1.  Miller and Modigliani Theory of Irrelevance 
In their seminal paper, Modigliani and Miller (1958) showed that the value of 
the firm is independent of the capital structure it takes on (MM irrelevance).  They 
argue that there would be arbitrage opportunities in the perfect capital market if the 
value of the firm depends on its capital structure. Furthermore, investor can 
neutralise any capital structure decision of the firms if both investor and firms can 
borrow at the same rate of interest. Though this theory is based on many unrealistic 
assumptions, yet it provides the basics theoretical background for further research. 
 
2.2.  The Trade-off Theory 
The trade-off theory says that a firm’s adjustment toward an optimal leverage is 
influenced by three factors namely taxes, costs of financial distress and agency costs. 
 
(a)  Taxes 
Interest, being a tax deductible expense, decreases the tax liability and 
increases the after tax cash flows. Firms in their attempt to increase cash flows and 
market value will embark on higher level of debt if the tax rate is higher. Thus tax 
rate and leverage have positive relationship.  
 
(b)  Bankruptcy Costs  
The possibility of default on debts increases with the increase in level of debt 
beyond the optimal point. Should the firm default on repayment of loan; the control of 
the firm will be shifted from shareholders to bondholders who will try to repossess 
their investment through the process of bankruptcy. Because of the possible financial 
distress caused by the higher level of leverage, a firm may face two types of 
bankruptcy costs. They are direct costs and indirect costs. Direct costs include the 
administrative costs of the bankruptcy process. If the firm is large in size, these costs 
constitute only small percentage for the firm. However, for a small firm, these fixed 
costs constitute higher percentage and are considered active variable in deciding the 
level of debt. The indirect costs arise because of change in investment policies of the 
firm encase the firm foresees possible financial distress. To avoid possible bankruptcy, 
firm will cut down expenditures on research and development, training and education 
of employees, advertisement etc. Furthermore, customers begin to doubt the firm’s 
ability to maintain the same level of quality in goods and services. This doubt appears 
in the form of drop in sales and eventually results in drop of the market share price of 
the firm.  
This implies that the potential benefits from employing leverage are shadowed 
by the potential costs of bankruptcy. 
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2.3.  Agency Theory 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) identify the possible conflict between shareholders 
and managers interests because of the manager’s share of less than 100 percent in the 
firm. Furthermore, acting as agents to shareholders, managers try to appropriate wealth 
away from bondholders to shareholders by taking more debt and investing in risky 
projects. The managers’ given role has many implications for the capital structure of a 
firm. To be more specific, the following summary points are presented.  
 
(a)  The Free Cash Flow Hypothesis 
 Free cash flow refers to cash flow available after funding all projects with 
positive cash flows. Managers having less than 100 percent stake in business may try 
to use the free cash flows sub-optimally or use them to their own advantage rather 
than to increase value of the firm. Jensen (1986) suggests that this problem can be 
somehow controlled by increasing the stake of managers in the business or by 
increasing debt in the capital structure, thereby reducing the amount of “free” cash 
available to managers [Jensen (1986); Stultz (1990)]. Here the reduction in cash flow 
because of debt financing is considered to be the benefit of debt financing.  
 
(b)  Overinvestment and Underinvestment Problems 
The bondholder expropriation hypothesis says that shareholders try to gain 
advantage at the cost of bondholders. If investment yields high returns, the extra or 
additional benefits go to shareholders and if the firm fails, the bondholders also sustain 
the loss. So bondholders share extra risks for no reward. Being agents to shareholders, 
management tries to invest even in projects that may not have good chances of viability. 
This phenomenon is termed as “overinvestment problem”. The losses sustained by 
shareholders because of this incentive are termed as “asset substitution effect”.   
On the other hand, the underinvestment problem refers to the tendency of 
managers to avoid safe net present value projects in which value of equity may 
decrease a little, however, increase in value of debt maybe high. This happens 
because management, being primarily responsible to shareholders, does not concern 
itself with the overall increase in value of the firm rather it tries to increase the value 
of equity only [Myers and Majluf (1984)]. 
Jenson and Meckling (1976) propose that optimal capital structure is reached 
by trading off the agency costs of debt against the benefits of debt.  
 
2.4.  Information Costs and Signalling Effects 
Another approach to explain the capital structure of firms is the differences in 
the level of information, which the outsiders have about the investment opportunities 
and income distribution of the firm. Information asymmetry may result in two 
different outcomes for capital structure.  
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The first effect on capital structure because of information is called signalling 
with proportion of debt. Ross (1977) says that managers have better knowledge of 
the income distribution of the firm. When they issue debt, it may generate positive 
signals to the outside world about the firm’s income distribution suggesting that the 
firm has stable income and is able to pay the periodic instalments and interest 
payments. In this regard, higher debt may show higher confidence of managers in the 
firm’s smooth income distribution and adequacy of the income. Thus firms in their 
efforts to increase investors’ confidence and thus increase the value of equity will 
use higher debt in the capital structure. 
Another possible effect of information is upon the mispricing of new 
securities. Myers and Majluf (1984) say that investors generally perceive that 
managers use private information to issue risky securities when they are overpriced. 
This perception of investors leads to the underpricing of new equity issue. 
Sometimes this underpricing is very severe and cause substantial loss to the existing 
shareholders. Because of this, firms will avoid issuing equity for financing new 
project; rather they will first fulfil their needs of financing from internally generated 
funds then issue debt if further financing is required and finally issue equity as a last 
resort. This has been termed as “Pecking Order Theory”.  Krasker (1986) says the 
same that equity prices fall when new issue of stock is given. Because of this 
phenomenon firms are inclined to finance new projects from internally generated 
funds or debt.  
 
3.  DATA AND MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES 
 
3.1.  Source of Data 
The study is based on the data taken from the State Bank of Pakistan 
publication “Balance Sheet Analysis of Joint Stock Companies Listed on The 
Karachi Stock Exchange Volume-II 1996-2001”. This publication provides useful 
information on key accounts of the financial statements of all listed firms of KSE for 
six year period.  
 
3.2.  The Sample 
Initially we decided to include all listed firms in our analysis for the period 
1997-2001. As the capital structure of the firms in financial sector is quite different 
from firms in non-financial sector, we excluded all firms in financial sector like 
banks, insurance companies, and investment companies. We also excluded those 
firms from our analysis for which complete data was not available for the period 
1997-2001. To avoid outlier in the data that can possibly distort the analysis, we 
excluded all firms that had values at least three standard deviation from the average 
value of the total firms. Finally we were left with the sample of 445 firms in non-
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financial sector industries listed on Karachi Stock Exchange from 1997 to 2001. In 
this way we have total of 2225 firm-years.  
 
3.3.  Dependent and Independent Variables 
After discussing the various theories of capital structure, now we discuss the 
potential dependent and independent variables for our study. We take the debt to 
total assets ratios as a proxy for leverage (dependent variable). For independent 
variables, though there can be many, however, following Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
we take only four main independent variables namely, tangibility, profitability, 
growth and size of the firm.  
 
Measure of Leverage (LG) 
Several research studies have used both market and book value based 
measures of leverage [Titman and Wessels (1988); Rajan and Zingales (1995)]. The 
former measure divides book value of debt by book value of debt plus market value 
of equity and the later measure divides the book value of debt by book value of debt 
plus book value of equity. We use the book value measure of leverage. This can be 
justified with the argument that optimal level of leverage is determined by the trade-
off between the benefits and costs of debt financing. The main benefit of leverage is 
the cash savings generated because of the debt-tax shield. This tax shield benefits are 
not changed by market value of the debt once it is issued [Banerjee, et al. (2000)]. 
This is why market value of debt becomes irrelevant. On the other hand, the primary 
cost of borrowing is the increased chances of bankruptcy. If a firm falls in financial 
distress and goes into bankruptcy, then the relevant value of the debt is the book 
value of debt. Finally, book value measure provides relative ease and accuracy with 
which it can be calculated.  
Another consideration in deciding the appropriate measure of leverage is to 
take total debt or only long term debt as a percentage of total assets. Though capital 
structure theories consider long term debt as a proxy for financial leverage, we use 
the measure of total debt because in Pakistan firms have mostly short-term financing 
as the average firm size is small which makes access to capital market difficult in 
terms of cost and technical difficulties. The main sources of debt in Pakistan have 
been commercial banks, which do not encourage long term loans, with almost no 
reliance on market based debt until mid 1994 when government moved to remove 
most of the constraints among which one action was to amend company law to 
permit corporate entities to raise debt directly from the market in the form of TFCs 
(Term Finance Certificates). So corporate bond market has limited history and is in 
the process of development. This explains why firms on average in Pakistan have 
more short term financing than long term financing. Booth, et al. (2001) also pointed 
in their study on determinants of capital structure in developing countries including 
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Pakistan that the use of short term financing is higher than long term financing in 
developing countries.  
 
Independent Variables 
 
1.  Tangibility of Assets (TG) 
A firm with large amount of fixed asset can borrow at relatively lower rate of 
interest by providing the security of these assets to creditors. Having the incentive of 
getting debt at lower interest rate, a firm with higher percentage of fixed asset is 
expected to borrow more as compared to a firm whose cost of borrowing is higher 
because of having less fixed assets. Thus we expect a positive relationship between 
tangibility of assets and leverage. We measure tangibility of asset (TG) as a ratio of 
fixed assets divided by total assets. We take total gross amount of fixed assets as the 
numerator. Using total gross amount of fixed assets rather than net depreciated value 
of assets makes sense as (i) different firms may possibly use different deprecation 
methods which may create unevenness in the data (ii) a firm can pledge an asset 
having a market value even if it has been fully depreciated. Calculating tangibility 
this way, the ratio was above one in some cases suggesting that total gross fixed 
assets were more than total assets. Our first hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1:  A firm with higher percentage of fixed assets will have a higher 
debt ratio. 
 
2. Size (SZ) 
There are two conflicting viewpoints about the relationship of size to leverage 
of a firm. First, large firms do not consider the direct bankruptcy costs as an active 
variable in deciding the level of leverage as these costs are fixed by constitution and 
constitute a smaller proportion of the total firm’s value. And also, larger firms being 
more diversified have lesser chances of bankruptcy [Titman and Wessels (1988)]. 
Following this, one may expect a positive relationship between size and leverage of a 
firm.  
Second, contrary to first view, Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that there is 
less asymmetrical information about the larger firms. This reduces the chances of 
undervaluation of the new equity issue and thus encourages the large firms to use 
equity financing. This means that there is negative relationship between size and 
leverage of a firm. Following Rajan and Zingales (1995), we expect a negative 
relationship between size and leverage of the firm. 
We measure size (SZ) of the firm by the taking the natural log of the sales as 
this measure smoothens the variation in the figure over the periods of time.  
Hypothesis 2:  There is a negative relationship between size and leverage of 
the firm.  
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3.  Growths (GT) 
Empirically, there is much controversy about the relationship between growth 
rate and level of leverage. According to pecking order theory hypothesis, a firm will 
use first internally generated funds which may not be sufficient for a growing firm. 
And next options  for the growing firms is to use debt financing which implies that a 
growing firm will have a high leverage [Drobetz and Fix (2003)]. 
On the other hand, agency costs for growing firms are expected to be higher 
as these firms have more flexibility with regard to future investments. The reason is 
that bondholders fear that such firms may go for risky projects in future as they have 
more choice of selection between risky and safe investment opportunities. Deeming 
their investments at risk in future, bondholders will impose higher costs at lending to 
growing firms. Growing firms, thus, facing higher cost of debt will use less debt and 
more equity. Congruent with this, Titman and Wessels (1988); Barclay, et al. (1995) 
and Rajan and Zingales (1995) all find a negative relationship between growth 
opportunities and leverage. 
Initially we expect that firms with higher growth opportunities will have 
higher level of leverage. Different research studies have used different measures of 
growth; like market to book value of equity, research expenditure to total sales 
measure and annual percentage increase in total assets [Titman and Wessels (1988)]. 
Given the structure of data we measure growth (GT) as a percentage increase in total 
assets, as the data was taken from the State Bank of Pakistan publication which does 
not contain information on annual stock prices and research expenditure of the listed 
firms.  
Hypothesis 3: Firms with a higher growth rate will have higher leverage.  
 
4.  Profitability (PF) 
Given the pecking order hypothesis firms tend to use internally generated 
funds first and than resort to external financing. This implies that profitable firms 
will have less amount of leverage [Myers and Majluf (1984)]. We expect a negative 
relationship between profitability and leverage.  
We measure profitability (PF) as the ratio of net income before taxes divided 
by total assets. Previous studies have used earning before interest and taxes (EBIT) 
divided by total assets, as a measure of profitability as it is independent of leverage 
effects. However we use the said measure as the data taken from the State Bank of 
Pakistan publication does not permit us to calculate (EBIT).  
Hypothesis 4: Firms with higher profitability with have lesser leverage.  
Table 1 summarises the discussion on the determinants of capital structure 
and their measures and the expected relationship with leverage as par our 
hypotheses.  
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Table 1 
 Potential Determinants of Capital Structure, Their Measures, and 
 Expected Relationship with Leverage 
Determinant            Measure (Proxy) 
Expected Effect on 
Leverage (Hypothesis) 
Tangibility Total Gross Fixed Assets/ Total Assets Positive 
Size Log of Sale Negative 
Growth Annual Percentage Change in Total Assets Positive 
Profitability EBT/Total Assets Negative 
 
Table 2 presents the mean, median, maximum, minimum and standard 
deviation for the variables discussed above.  
 
Table 2 
 Five-years Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
  Leverage Tangibility Profitability Size Growth 
 Mean  0.65  0.84  0.03  2.74  0.07  
 Median 0.63  0.84  0.03  2.74  0.02  
 Maximum 1.641  2.712  0.54  5.23  1.83  
 Minimum 0.04  0.05   (0.65)  (0.30)  (0.89) 
 Stan. Deviation 0.27  0.37  0.12  0.73  0.23  
 
To check for the possible multicollinearity among the independent variables, 
we calculate the Pearson’s co-efficient of correlations for the independent variables. 
Table 3 presents the results. 
 
Table 3 
 Estimated Correlations between Independent Variables 
  Tang Profit Size Growth 
Tang 1    
Profit –0.27191 1   
Size –0.23392 0.295909 1  
Growth –0.15216 0.083498 0.128503 1 
 
1Theoretically, total debt/total assets ratio should be less than one or one at maximum. However, we 
find many firms especially in textile industry with negative equity that explains why this ratio is above one. 
2Theoretically speaking, fixed assets/total assets too should be lower than one. However, we use 
gross fixed assets/total assets ratio as a measure of tangibility. Tangibility ratio of above one tells that the 
firm has sufficient number of depreciated yet indisposed-off assets so that the gross value of all these 
assets is fairly higher than the total present depreciated value of all assets.  
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As we can see from the above table, the multicollinearity problem is not too 
severe among the selected independent variables. However, the table sheds light on 
some interesting correlations. First, tangibility is negatively correlated with the other 
three variables. It is interesting to observe that large firms have lesser-fixed assets as 
a percentage of total assets. One explanation may be that large firms do carry more 
fixed assets in absolute rupee terms; however, they constitute lesser percentage of 
total assets as the overall firm’s size is too large. On the other hand, small firms may 
employ fewer amounts of fixed assets in absolute terms; however, the overall 
percentage is higher because fixed assets are needed and added in chunks.  
The second observation is the positive correlation between profitability and 
size suggesting that large firms are more profitable. Third, the positive correlation 
between size and growth shows that large firms grow more. One explanation may be 
that large firms can afford to spend more on research and development and thus are 
able to add new product lines with which growth opportunities increase.  
 
4.  SPECIFICATION OF THE MODEL 
The study uses panel data regression analysis. The panel data analysis 
facilitates analysis of cross-sectional and time series data. We use the pooled 
regression type of panel data analysis. The pooled regression also called the constant 
coefficients model is one where both intercepts and slopes are constant. The cross 
section company data and time series data are pooled together in a single column 
assuming that there is no significant cross section or temporal effects.  
The general form of our model is: 
ε+β+β= itit XLG 0  … … … … … (1) 
 LGit  = The measure of leverage of a firm i at time t  
 0β  = The intercept of the equation 
 iβ  = The change co-efficient for Xit variables 
 Xit = The different independent variables for leverage of a firm i at time t 
 i = The number of the firms i.e. i = 1, 2, 3….N (in this study N= 445 firms) 
 t = The time period i.e. t = 1, 2, 3…T (in this study T = 5 years). 
Specifically, when we convert the above general least square equation into our 
specified variables, the equation will be:  
ε+β+β+β+β+β= )()()()( 43210 ititititit PFGTSZTGLG  … … (2) 
 LG = Leverage  
 TG = Tangibility of assets 
 SZ = Size  
 GT = Growth 
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 PF = Profitability  
 ε = The error term. 
 
5.  RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS 
The Table 4 shows the summary output for the regression analysis. The R2 
shows that only 25 percent of the variations in the dependent variable (LG) are 
explained by the variations in the given four independent variables. The Adjusted R2 
is slightly below the R2. The F-statistics shows the validity of the model as its 
97.53130 value is well above its Prob(F-statistic) value of 0.0000.  
 
Table 4 
Summary Output of the Regression Analysis 
Independent Variables Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic p-value 
Tang (TG) 0.0279 0.0212 1.3158 0.1885 
Size (SZ) 0.0180 0.0103 1.7487 0.0806 
Growth (GT) –0.0398 0.0173 –2.2981 0.0217 
Profit (PF) –1.1069 0.0610 –18.1599 0.0000 
     
 
R-square 0.25580 MS of 
Regression 5.35758 
Adjusted R-square 0.25318 Sum square 
Regression 21.43032 
Standard Error 0.23438 
Sum squared 
residuals 62.34771 
F-statistic 
97.53130 
Total sum of 
square 83.77803 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00000  
 
Analysing the results for the effects of independent variable on dependent 
variable, we find that asset tangibility is positively correlated with leverage. 
However, we do not find much evidence that this relationship is statistically 
significant. Though the positive sign confirms our hypothesis about tangibility of 
assets, the statistical insignificance does not support our hypothesis. Thus we reject 
our hypothesis 1. The results thus do not confirm to the Jensen and Meckling’s 
(1976) and Myers’ (1977) version of trade-off theory that debt level should increase 
with more fixed tangible assets on balance sheet. 
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Size (SZ) is positively correlated with leverage. This suggests that large firms 
in Pakistan borrow more and small firms are fearful of more debt. This contradicts to 
our earlier hypothesis about the size of the firm that large firms will have lower level 
of leverage. This confirms to the bankruptcy cost theory on leverage that fixed direct 
costs of bankruptcy constitute a smaller portion of the total value of the firm thus 
larger firms do not hesitate to take more debt because of fear of bankruptcy. At the 
same time, the results contradict to the Rajan and Zingales (1995) view of less 
asymmetric information about large firms suggesting that new equity issue will not 
be under priced and thus large firms will issue more equity. We find the relationship 
significant at 10 percent level but not at 5 percent and 1 percent level.  
Growth is negatively related to leverage and is significant at 10 percent and 5 
percent level. This suggests that growing firms in Pakistan use more of equity and 
less debt to finance the new investment opportunities. This confirms to our earlier 
hypothesis about growth opportunities. This also supports  the simple version of 
pecking order theory that suggest growing firms will resort first to the internally 
generated funds for fulfilling their financing needs. However, this does not support 
the extended version of pecking order theory that suggests that internally generated 
funds may not be sufficient for a growing firms and next option for such firm would 
be to use debt financing. 
One explanation for low level of leverage for a growing firm may be that a 
growing firm is considered to be risky in terms of the new investment opportunities 
it embarks upon. Deeming their investment at risk in future, creditors impose high 
cost of lending to such firms. Facing higher costs of debt, growing firms prefer 
equity financing over debt financing. On the other hand, there may be some 
reluctance on the part of the growing firms to use debt financing. The reason is that 
growing firms face relatively higher investment risk as compared to stagnant firms. 
Investment opportunities will be more risky if the firms expand themselves to more 
new lines of businesses. To reduce the overall risk, the firms will not assume more 
financial risk and will use the option of equity financing.  
One other explanation may be that firms in Pakistan grow but at lower rate. 
The internally generated funds are enough to finance the expansion programmes and 
the firms do not have to resort to external financing.  
Of all the independent variables chosen for this study, profitability has turn 
out to be the most statistically significant determinant of capital structure in the 
context of Pakistan. Profitability is negatively correlated with income. This suggests 
that profitable firms in Pakistan use more of equity and less debt. This supports the 
pecking order theory and also approves our earlier hypothesis about profitability.  
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we use pooled regression model of panel data analysis to 
measure the determinants of capital structure in listed Pakistani non-financial firms 
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for five-year period. We use total debt ratio divided by total assets as a proxy for 
leverage.  We use four independent variables to measure their effect on leverage. 
The results show that assets tangibility is positively correlated with debt; 
however, this relationship is not statistically significant. We may conclude that asset 
structure does not matter in determination of capital structure of Pakistani firms. This 
is in contrast to the previous empirical studies by Titman and Wessels (1988); Rajan 
and Zingales (1995) and Fama and French (2000) say that tangibility should be an 
important determinant of leverage.  
Size measured by taking log of sales is positively correlated with leverage. 
This suggests that large firms will employ more debt. The implication is that large 
firms consider themselves to have less chances of falling into financial distress and 
have more capacity to absorb shocks. One may also infer that fixed direct bankruptcy 
costs are smaller for large firms as a percentage of their total value; that is why they 
do not fear bankruptcy that much as the smaller firms do. Facing lower bankruptcy 
costs, large firms take more debt.  
Growth measured by the annual percentage change in total assets is negatively 
correlated with leverage that supports the simple version of pecking order theory that 
growing firms finance their investment opportunities first by their internally 
generated funds. However this does not support the extended version of pecking 
order theory.  
Strong relationship was found between profitability and leverage. Profitability 
as measured by net profit before taxes divided by total assets is negatively correlated 
with leverage that supports the pecking order theory.  
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